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What's the Hang Up?: Exploring the Effect of Postmaterialism on Hung
Parliaments
Abstract
Elections in majoritarian states are supposed to produce single-party majority governments. However, the
most recent elections in the three main advanced industrial majoritarian parliamentary democracies - the
United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia - failed to produce majority governments. No single party won a
majority of the parliamentary seats in any of these three elections, a condition commonly referred to as a
hung parliament. Despite the literature's tendency to dismiss hung parliaments as electoral abnormalities,
this recent wave of hung parliaments among such similarly situated states suggests the presence of an
underlying causal factor that contributes to these outcomes. The current study analyzes the role played
by the rise of postmaterialist values in advanced industrial societies in the occurrence of hung
parliaments through multiple least squares regression. While the study is not able to arrive at a universal
explanation for hung parliaments in all three cases, it is able to explain hung parliaments in Australia and
Canada.
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WHAT'S THE HANG UP?:
EXPLORING THE EFFECT OF POSTMATERIALISM ON HUNG PARLIAMENTS

Jennifer Biess
Elections in majoritarian states are supposed to produce single-party majority governments.
However, the most recent elections in the three main advanced industrial majoritarian parliamentary
democracies - the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia - failed to produce majority governments. No
single party won a majority of the parliamentary seats in any of these three elections, a condition
commonly referred to as a hung parliament. Despite the literature's tendency to dismiss hung
parliaments as electoral abnormalities, this recent wave of hung parliaments among such similarly
situated states suggests the presence of an underlying causal factor that contributes to these outcomes.
The current study analyzes the role played by the rise of postmaterialist values in advanced industrial
societies in the occurrence of hung parliaments through multiple least squares regression. While the study
is not able to arrive at a universal explanation for hung parliaments in all three cases, it is able to explain
hung parliaments in Australia and Canada.

Abstract:

INTRODUCTION
Elections in majoritarian states are designed to produce single-party majority
governments. However, the most recent elections in the three main advanced industrial
majoritarian parliamentary democracies - the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia - failed
t� produce majority governments. No single party won a majority of the parliamentary seats in
any of these three elections, a condition commonly referred to as a hung parliament. Despite the
literature's tendency to dismiss hung parliaments as electoral abnormalities, the recent wave of
hung parliaments among such institutionally similar states suggests the presence of an
underlying causal factor that contributes to these outcomes.1 This study seeks to analyze the
role played by the rise of postmaterialist values in the occurrence of hung parliaments in
advanced industrial societies.
After the UK's 2010 general election, its hung parliament sparked a national
conversation over electoral reform. However, there is widespread disagreement over which
system is best.2 If the UK and other countries seek to ameliorate their "hung parliament
problems" and want to enact electoral reform, it is imperative to first understand what causes
hung parliaments. Armed with that information, these countries can make educated decisions
about more appropriate electoral systems. While this discussion is limited to three specific
countries, the general lessons can be extended to other advanced industrial states, especially
those with majoritarian electoral systems.

1 Kalitowski 2008.
2 Wheeler 2010.
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LITERATURE REVIEW

The Westminster Model
The UK, Australia and Canada are all built on the Westminster model of parliamentary
democracy, also referred to as the majoritarian or plurality model. Westminster model
democracies generally have two-party systems. Proponents of this structure emphasize the
ability of the two-party system to provide voters with a clear choice between two alternatives
and produce dominant single-party majority governments.3 Two party systems also tend to be
one-dimensional in that the two parties generally only differ on one main issue.4
Electoral systems in majoritarian polities generally follow the first-past-the-post style of
elections and use single member districts. Whoever wins the most votes in a given district,
whether a plurality or a majority, wins the seat. While this is the most common electoral format
in Westminster model democracies, there are some exceptions. Australia uses the alternative
vote system, in which voters order the candidates in terms of preference. First, they calculate
the vote based on voters' first choices. If no candidate wins a majority, the candidate who
received the least number of votes is eliminated, and his or her votes are redistributed to the
voters' second choice candidate. This process continues until one candidate wins a majority of
the votes in that district; thus, it is often considered a true majority election formula.5
Despite their electoral and party structures, third parties have been able to win seats in
all three states included in the current study, albeit with varying degrees of success. Generally,
one of the two traditional parties represents the ideological left, which is popular with the
working class, and the other stands for the ideological right, which traditionally appeals to the
middle class.6 In the UK, the traditional parties are the Labour Party, which has historically
been ideological left party, and the Conservative Party, which has been the ideological right
party; however, the Liberal Democrat Party has emerged as a strong, ideologically centrist third
party. In Canada, the established national parties are the Liberal Party and the Conservative
Party, where the Liberal Party represents the ideological left and the Conservative Party
embodies the ideological right. A variety of minor parties are prominent. Together minor
parties have garnered about thirty percent of the votes in recent elections.? Two-party politics is
strongest in Australia. The Australian Labor Party is the traditional party of the ideological left,
while the Liberal-National Coalition represents the traditional party of the ideological right.
Although there are a variety of minor parties, the most notable is the recent rise of the Green
Party in Australia, which has increased its share of the vote from 1 % in 1990 to 12% 2010.8

3 Lijphart 1999.

4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.

6 Inglehart 1990.
7 Parliament of Canada.
8 Newman 2004-2005 (for years 1987-2004); Australia Votes 2007; Australia Votes 2010.
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Hung Parliaments
Elections in Westminster model parliamentary democracies are designed to produce
stable single-party majority governments. However, exceptions do occur, and these exceptions
are referred to as hung parliaments. By definition a hung parliament is "one in which no party
has an overall majority," meaning also that no single party has won more than half of the
parliamentary seats.9 Generally, hung parliaments have been interpreted as isolated electoral
anomalies.1 °
The most recent elections in the UK, Canada, and Australia have all produced hung
parliaments. Before Australia's 2010 election, its most recent hung parliament occurred in
1940.11 In the UK, before the 2010 general election the most recent hung parliament occurred in
1974.12 Of the three states compared in the present study, Canada has experienced hung
parliaments most frequently. Of the nine federal elections held between 1957 and 1979, six
resulted in hung parliaments. However, from the 1980 election until the 2004 election Canadian
federal elections produced majority governments each time. The federal elections of 2004, 2006,
and 2008 all produced hung parliaments)3 However, the phenomenon of hung parliaments has
largely been ignored in the literature. The purpose of this study is to identify factors that
explain this current wave of hung parliaments in advanced industrial Westminster model
parliamentary democracies.
The Decline of Class-Voting and the Rise of Postmaterialist Values
Traditionally, class has been the primary electoral cleavage. Some scholars argue,
however, that in advanced industrial societies the emergence of new social issues has led to a
decline in the dominance of class-based voting.14
Clark and Upset argue that the importance of class in advanced industrial societies is
decreasing because "in recent decades traditional hierarchies have declined and new social
differences have emerged." 15 Clark and Upset claim that class-based voting has declined and is
being replaced by post-industrial politics, which they refer to as the New Political Culture
(NPC) . The following circumstances define the NPC: (1) social and economic issues are clearly
distinguished; (2) social issues and consumption issues are more salient as compared to
fiscalj economic issues; (3) issue politics and more widespread citizen participation are
increasing while hierarchical political organizations have declined; and (4) the NPC views are
more prevalent in younger, more educated, and more affluent people and societies.16 Clark and
Upset ground their reasoning in terms of the economy and the family, which relate to the
decreased influence of hierarchical social structures. It is these hierarchies, they argue, that

9 BBC News 2010.
10 Kalitowski 2008.
11 Liddy 2010.
12 Butler and Kavanagh 1974.
13 Parliament of Canada 2009.
14 Clark and Lipset 2001; Inglehart 1990; Dalton 2002.
15 Clark and Lipset 2001, 40.
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maintain rigid class structures. They contend that political issues change with increased
affluence: with increased affluence, people will take basic security needs for granted and
consider other things, including lifestyle and amenity issues. This decreases the power of class
and hierarchy.1 7 They also argue that the family has embraced more egalitarian values, which
further decreases the importance of hierarchical arrangements in society.18
However, Hout, Brooks, and Manza dispute Clark and Upset's claim that class is
declining; instead they argue that class is becoming more complex. They concede that
dichotomous class models are no longer appropriate, but affirm that this does not mean class is
dying. Hout and his colleagues make several specific criticisms of Clark and Upset's work.
First, they point to the persistence of income inequality despite the growth of the middle class to
show that class is still relevant in the modem context.19 From a methodological stance, they
argue that the Alford Index used by Clark and Upset to measure the decline of class-based
voting is too crude and underestimates the importance of class in voting.20 21 Most importantly,
they argue that Clark and Upset do not clearly make the case relating hierarchy and class.22 This
critique points to the conceptual gap in Clark and Upset's argument.
While Clark and Upset focus on hierarchical societal structures that promote rigid class
stratification, Inglehart's theory of postmaterialist values focuses on the impact of increased
affluence on an individual's value priorities, drawing primarily on Maslow's hierarchy of
needs. His argument is two-fold. First, Inglehart posits that when people experience economic
scarcity and hardship they will give high priority to economic security and safety needs.
However, people in an environment of affluence do not experience the same scarcity, so they
will move beyond economic security and safety needs and place more value on higher order
aesthetic and intellectual needs, which he refers to as postmaterialist values.23 Second, Inglehart
stresses that the conditions in which one grows up are most important, since it is when values
form. Because of this he stresses that the impact of postmaterialist values should increase over
time as more people grow up in affluent circumstances.24
Inglehart recognizes that materialist values, those based on economic security and safety
needs, will still be prevalent in society. This leads him to argue that postmaterialists will prefer
change-oriented political parties.25 Traditionally, the "change-oriented" parties are those of the
ideological Left. This would lead affluent, middle-class voters to vote for Leftist political parties
despite their class-based connection with the parties of the Right. Furthermore, working class
17
18
19

Clark and Upset 2001, 4l .
Ibid., 51.

Ibid., 60.
20 The Alford Index is calculated by subtracting the percentage of middle class voters who vote for the

traditionally working class party from the percentage of the working class that vote for the working class
party.

21

Ibid., 63.
22 Ibid., 59.

23
24

Inglehart 1971.

Ibid.
25 Ibid.

18

RES PUBLICA

voters, who are more likely to experience scarcity and possess materialist values, may choose to
vote for the parties of the Right who traditionally espouse those values.26 Because of this,
Inglehart contends, liThe rise of Postmaterialist issues, therefore, tends to neutralize political
polarization based on social class."27
Dalton characterizes Inglehart's framework as lithe most systematic attempt to describe
the value changes that are transforming advanced industrial societies."28 Dalton makes a clear
distinction between materialist and postmaterialist values. Values that stem from physiological
needs, which include both sustenance and safety needs, are deemed materialist; these values
include economic stability, economic growth, fighting rising prices, strong defense forces,
fighting crime, and maintaining order. After safety and sustenance needs are met, people can
attend to their social and self-actualization needs. Postmaterialist values stem from these higher
order needs and include having a less impersonal society, having more say in your job or
community, having more say in government, valuing free speech, believing that ideas count,
and valuing green space.29
However, he also identifies two key areas of criticism of Inglehart's argument. The first
pertains mostly to Inglehart's methodology. Several studies argue that Inglehart's value index is
closely associated with the tides of economic conditions instead of the conditions of one's
childhood. The other school of criticism debates the nature of value change. Flanagan argues
that values are changing on more than just a single materialjpostmaterial dimension, while
Braithwaite contends that societal values are moving from security-based to harmony-based
values3o. Dalton concedes that Inglehart's theory is overly simplistic, but also contends that
critics who disagree on the nature of value change can fit their frameworks within Inglehart's
broader one.
Beck presents another critique of the postmaterialist values argument. He posits that
societies have moved from the first modernity to the second modernity. The first modernity
entails lithe collective patterns of life, progress and controllability, full employment and
exploitation of nature;" however, the developments of the first modernity have been fraught
with unintended consequences, which the second modernity must now rectify.31 Thus, the
recent concern with issues like environmentalism and nuclear disarmament, which are
postmaterialist values from Inglehart's perspective, actually is the result of the consequences of
development during the first modernity. Thus, for Beck the second modernity is reflexive.32
While Beck presents an interesting alternative thesis to the discussion of value change, he still
seems to agree that postmaterialist society or second modernity has different values than
materialist society of first modernity. Thus, while the exact nature of value change is still being

26
27

Inglehart 1990.

29
30
31
32

Ibid.

Ibid., 259.
28 Dalton 2002, 79.
Ibid.; Flanagan 1982; 1987; Braithwaite 1996.
Beck 1999, 2.
Ibid.
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debated, scholars agree that values have changed in advanced industrial societies; it is this point
that is central to the current study.
Both Dalton and Inglehart posit the existence of a New Politics dimension that accounts
for the emergent postmaterialist values.33 Dalton distinguishes between the "Old Politics" and
"New Politics" to differentiate between traditional and postmaterialist political alignments.34
Class is the primary factor that structures the old political cleavages, with the Old Left
representing the working class and labor unions and the Old Right identifying with business
interests and the middle class.35 New Politics is the postmaterialist political dimension. While
Dalton recognizes that Old Politics is still the primary ground for partisan conflict, he argues
that New Politics affects party systems in advanced industrial societies, because "it can cut
across the established Old Politics cleavage."36 Since new political cleavages do not line up with
old political cleavages, the emergence of this second dimension does not further polarize the
major parties. Also, non-established parties have been more likely to adopt postmaterialist
positions than the major parties, which has helped smaller parties be more successfuP7
Furthermore, the introduction of the New Politics cleavage has contributed to partisan
dealignment, which refers to "the erosion of the social group basis of party support."38 This
trend has increased electoral volatility and loosened the hold that the cleavages of Old Politics
had on voter choice.
This may also help to explain the importance of anti-party sentiment amongst
electorates in the UK, Canada, and Australia. Belanger contends that there is a feeling of
"political malaise" in postindustrial nations; people are becoming more critical of political
parties, especially after those parties fail to meet the electorate's expectations for policy and
service provision. While Belanger does not specifically connect his argument to those made by
Dalton, this could be due to Dalton's claim that it is generally minor parties that embrace
postmaterialist platforms rather than the traditional parties. Similarly, Belanger argues that
while this feeling is detrimental to major parties, it can be positive for third parties. Political
malaise manifests itself in two forms: negative attitudes toward the major parties, which he calls
specific antiparty sentiment and negative attitudes towards parties per se, which he refers to as
general antiparty sentiment.39 He finds that antipartyism brings people to vote for third parties.
This is especially true of people who feel specific antiparty sentiment; however, third parties
who utilize antiparty rhetoric and paint themselves as "antiparty parties" benefit from general
antiparty sentiment as wel1.40

33

Dalton 2002; Inglehart 1990.

34 Dalton 2002, 134.

35
36
37
38

Ibid.
Ibid.
Dalton 2002.
Ibid., 183.

39 Belanger 2004.

40

Ibid.
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES

But why are these developments relevant to the recent wave of hung parliaments in
majoritarian states? The decline of the old political cleavage of class and the rise of new political
postmaterialist issues has complicated the way in which people vote. The choice is no longer
between two distinct alternatives as proponents of the Westminster model claim. Class is
declining in its importance because other issues - postmaterialist social issues - are rising in
saliency. Thus, voters are no longer simply voting for whichever party most naturally
represents them based on their class background.
This study will draw primarily on Inglehart's conception of postmaterialist values and
Dalton's analysis of party politics in response to the rise of these values. The central hypothesis
of this work is that the decline of Old Politics and the concurrent rise of New Politics explains
the increased frequency of hung parliaments in advanced industrial Westminster model
parliamentary democracies. From this, I posit two hypotheses:
Hl:

The decline of class-based voting increases the likelihood of hung parliaments

H2:

The increase of postmaterialist values increases the likelihood of hung parliaments

Following Dalton's argument that the rise of postmaterialist values has contributed towards
party dealignment, I also predict the following:
H3:

Decreased partisanship increases the likelihood of hung parliaments.

Furthermore, non-established parties are more likely than traditional parties to embrace and
support postmaterialist issues. From this, I expect that minor parties that have incorporated
postmaterialist values and also antiparty sentiment towards major parties because they have
not adapted to these issues, which leads to the following hypotheses:
H4: Increased
Hs:

specific antiparty sentiment increases the likelihood of hung parliaments.

Incorporation of post-materialist values by minor parties increases the likelihood of hung parliaments.

METHODS
This study is a small comparative case study that includes the following cases: the
United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. These cases have been selected because they are all
advanced industrial Westminster model parliamentary democracies that have experienced
recent hung parliaments. This study approaches hung parliaments not only from a cross
national perspective, but also from a longitudinal one. General elections from the following
years are included in the study: from 1983 until 2010 in the UK, from 1984 until 2008 in Canada,
and from 1987 until 2007 in Australia.
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OPERATIONALIZATION AND MEASUREMENT

Dependent Variable:

Occurrence of Hung Parliament: While a dummy variable could be used to denote whether or not
a state's general election resulted in a hung parliament, this study operationalizes the hung
parliament variable instead as the size of the majority, in terms of parliamentary seats obtained
by the party that wins the most seats in the election. Explicitly, this will be measured as the
percentage of parliamentary seats won by the "winningest" party, which controls for the size of
the parliament. This variable indicates a hung parliament when the value of this measure is less
than fifty percent.
Independent Variables:

Class-based voting: To measure class-based voting the Alford Index is used. This measure
subtracts the proportion of middle-class voters who vote for the working class party from the
proportion of working class voters who vote for the working-class party.
Postmaterialist values: To measure the prevalence of postmaterialist values in each of the states in
this study, I use the four-item index of postmaterialist values from the World Values Survey.41
This index is derived from the following question series: "If you had to choose, which one of the
things on this card would you say is most important? And which would be the next most
important?" The answer choices are: "maintaining order in the nation," "giving people more
say," "fighting rising prices," and "protecting freedom of speech." Depending on their answers
to both questions, respondents are coded as materialist, postmaterialist or mixed. For each
country, the measure used is the percentage of respondents that are coded as postmaterialist on
this index.
Strength of Party Identification: To measure strength of party identification, the following
question is used: "Would you call yourself a very strong (fill in party), fairly strong, or not very
strong?" The measure used is the percentage of respondents who indicate very strong party
identification as a proportion of the total sample, which includes respondents who did not
identify with a political party.
Strong Antiparty-sentiment: In accordance with Belanger's operationalization of this sentiment,
questions from election studies asking for the respondent's feelings toward major parties are
used. If the respondent expresses negative feelings toward both major parties, they exhibit
specific antiparty sentiment. Questions used to measure this variable are worded similarly to
the following: "How do you feel about the [insert appropriate party]?" Strong antiparty
sentiment is measured as the percentage of respondents that indicated strong negative feelings
toward both major parties.

41 European and World Values Surveys four-wave integrated data file; World Values Survey 2005 official
data file.
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Index of Third Party Ideology: This index ranges from zero to two and is comprised of two criteria:
social justice issues in minor party ideologies and success of green parties. With regards to the
former, third party platforms are referenced where available for mentions of social justice and
equality for women and minority groups. Where party platforms are not available, secondary
data describing the political parties is used. Environmentalism is another prong of
postmaterialism. However, the presence of this cannot be measured by looking at party
platforms because in the contemporary political climate, most parties, not just third parties, take
a stance on environmental issues. A better indicator of the importance of environmental issues
is the presence of a green party. However, the mere presence of a green party does not indicate
that it is politically strong. Therefore, this study counts only green parties that won at least one
parliamentary seat in the general election. These two indicators, inclusion of women's and
minority rights into the party's election platform and the presence of a seat-winning green
party, are combined into an index of post-materialist value incorporation. This index ranges
from 0 to 2, where zero means neither criterion is met. One indicates that one of the criterions is
met, and two indicates that both criteria are met.

DATA AND ANALYSIS PLAN
Most of the data for this study is gathered from the Australian Election Study (AES), the
Canadian Election Study (CES), and the British Election Study (BES). However, the data
regarding postmaterialist values came from the World Values Survey (WVS) . While it would
have been ideal to measure postmaterialist values using the various national election studies, no
question or set of questions regarding postmaterialist values has been consistently asked across
all three nations over time. Although the waves of the WVS do not directly correspond to the
election years in the UK, Canada, and Australia, this data is preferable because it asks
consistently worded questions to respondents in all three nations for each wave, providing
greater consistency over time and across cases. Therefore, the data for each country from the
wave of the WVS that is closest to the election is used as a measure of postmaterialist values at
the time of the election. Finally, data regarding the dependent variable is obtained from election
result archives. The data will be analyzed using a series of multiple least squares linear
regressions. Preliminarily, bivariate correlations are run at each stage of the analysis to test for
multicollinearity. Next, regression models are run for the entire model using data from all three
cases. Then, separate regression models are run for each country individually. Because of the
small number of general elections included in this study, a significance level of .10 is used.
DATA ANALYSIS
Analysis Across All Cases
The bivariate correlations show that multicollinearity exists between the percentage of
respondents who exhibit antiparty sentiment and both the percentage of respondents who are
strong party identifiers and the Alford Index of class voting. To account for this, five separate
multiple regressions are run: one including all variables (Model l), one excluding antiparty
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sentiment (Model 2), one excluding strong party identifiers (Model 3), one excluding class
voting (Model 4), and finally one excluding both strong party identifiers and class voting
(Model S) . Model 2 and Model S completely alleviate the effects of multicollinearity from the
analysis.
Table 1: Postmaterialist Values and the Occurrence of Hung Parliaments in All Cases
Dependent Variable: Occurrence of Hung Parliament, in percentage of seats won by the winningest party
Model l
Model 4
Model 2
Model 3
Model Make-Up
All variables
Class voting
Strong Party
Strong Antiparty
(Variable excluded to
included
excluded
Identifiers
Sentiment Excluded
account for
excluded
collinearity)

1983-2010)
Model 5
Class voting and
Strong party
identifiers
excluded

Dependent Variable
Class Voting
(Alford Index)

0.050
(.140)

.069
(.097)

.072
(.140)

Postmaterialist Values

-.144
(.216)

-.359*
(.188)

-.152
(.218)

Percent of Strong
Party Identifiers

.421
(.377)

.992**
(.311)

Strong Antiparty
Sentiment

-1.709*
(.096)

Index of Third Party
Ideology

-6.149
(5.161)

.418
3.692
(.027)
19
***p<.OO1, **p<.05, *p<.10

Adjusted R2
F-test
Model Significance
N

-.167
(.209)

-.188
(.210)

.442
(.381)
-1.880*
(.948)

-1.603**
(.723)

-1.887**
(.687)

-6.958
(5.750)

-6.738
(5.179)

-6.705
(5.245)

-7.317
(5.274)

.454
5.365
(.006)
19

.418
4.229
(.019)
19

.378
3.885
(.023)
19

.364
4.630
(.016)
19

Model l includes all five variables. The model is significant (p<.027) and accounts for
41.8% of the variance in the dependent variable, the percentage of parliamentary seats won by
the winningest party. However, because of the multicollinearity, the only variable that is
significant is antiparty sentiment in the expected direction: as strong antiparty sentiment
increases, the percentage of seats won by the winningest party decreases, which means that
hung parliaments are more likely. Excluding antiparty sentiment from the analysis resolves the
problem created by multicollinearity.
Model 2, which excludes anti-party sentiment and resolves the multicollinearity
problem, is significant (p<.006) and accounts for 4S.4% of the variance. Both postmaterialist
values and strong party identifiers are significantly related to the percentage of seats won by the
winningest party in the hypothesized directions. As the percentage of respondents who are
postmaterialist increase, the percentage of seats won by the winningest party decreases making
hung parliaments more likely. As the percentage of respondents who are strong party
identifiers decreases, the percentage of seats won by the winningest party decreases.
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Models 3, 4 and 5 exclude strong party identifiers, class voting, or both, respectively.
Each of these models is significant; however, the only significant independent variable is
antiparty sentiment. This suggests that the antiparty sentiment variable is picking up on
variance in the dependent variable that can be attributed to class voting and strong party
identification. Class voting and the third party ideology index are not significant in any of the
five models.
The United Kingdom
Amongst only the UK cases, bivariate correlations show that class voting is significantly
negatively correlated with the third party ideology index, and postmaterialist values are
significantly and negatively correlated with the percentage of respondents that are strong party
identifiers. This again poses the problem of multicollinearity. To avoid multicollinearity a
variety of different regression models are run. The first model includes all five independent
variables. Models 2 through 6 each exclude one of the independent variables. These models do
not completely alleviate the multicollinearity issue, since no single variable is responsible for
this problem as in the overall analysis. To completely resolve multicollinearity, Model 7
excludes both class voting and postmaterialist values, and Model 8 excludes both the
percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers and the third party ideology index.
Table 2A: Postmaterialist Values and the Occurrence of Hung Parliaments in the UK: Models 1 -4
Dependent Variable: Occurrence of Hung Parliament, in percentage of seats won by
the winningest party (1983-2010)

Model 2
Class voting excluded

Model 3
Postmaterialist values
excluded

Model 4
Strong party
identification
excluded

1.224
(.743)

-.491
(.961)

Model Make-Up
(Variable excluded to
account for
collinearity)
Dependent Variable
Class Voting

Model l
All variables included

Postmaterialist Values

.803
(.636)

1.086
(.716)

Strong Party
Identification

2.465
(.887)

1.567
(.706)

2.301
(.999)

Strong Antiparty
Sentiment

-2.127
(1.790)

-.529
(1.610)

-2.845
(1.934)

1.147
(2.814)

Third Party Ideology

5.095
(1.790)
.709
3.923
(.365)
7

-12.545
(5.643)
.586
3.120
(.257)
7

12.960
(14.048)
.622
3.471
<.236)
7

-21.929
(20.497)
.270
.681
(.667)
7

Adjusted R2
F-test
Model Significance
N

.938
(.690)

*p<.10, **p<.OS, ***p<.OOl

.545
(1.313)
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Table 2B: Postmaterialist Values and the Occurrence of Hung Parliaments in the UK: Models 5-8
Dependent Variable: Occurrence of Hung Parliament, in percentage of seats won by
the winningest party (1983-2010)

Model Make-Up
(Variable excluded to
account for
collinearity)

Model 7
Class voting and
postmaterialist values
excluded

Model 8
Strong party
identification and
third party ideology
excluded

Model 5
Strong Antiparty
Sentiment Excluded

Model 6
Third Party Ideology
Excluded

Class Voting

.399
(.571)

.699*
(.178)

.410
(.474)

Postmaterialist Values

1.043
(.662)

.909
(.428)

-.561
(.829)

Strong Party
Identification

1 .771
(.733)

2.234**
(.475)

.904
(.663)

-1.627
(.880)

-.878
(1.907)

-.510
(2.405)

.835
8.573
(.107)
7

-8.773
(6.064)
.406
2.368
(.249)
7

.331
.503
(.707)
7

Dependent Variable

Strong Antiparty
Sentiment
Third Party Ideology
Adjusted R2
F-test
Model Significance
N

-7.346
(9.903)
.649
3.772
(.220)
7

*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.OOl

None of the models are significant. However, in Model 6, which excludes the third
party ideology index, class voting and the percentage of respondents who are strong party
identifiers are significant. These relationships are significant in the hypothesized directions: as
the class voting decreases, the percentage of seats won by the winningest party decreases, and
as the percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers decreases the percentage of
seats won by the winningest party decreases. While Model 6 itself is not significant, it accounts
for 83.5% of the variance in the dependent variable. This suggests that lack of significance may
be attributable to the small sample size.
The prevalence of postmaterialist values is not significant in any of the models.
Antiparty sentiment is not significant in any of the models and is not significantly correlated
with any of the other independent variables. This stands in sharp contrast to the overall
analysis where antiparty sentiment is highly correlated with two of the independent variables
and the only significant independent variable when it is included in the model. This and the
overall insignificance of any of the models suggest that the UK does not follow the pattern
observed in the overall analyses.
Analysis of Canada
Amongst only the Canadian cases, the third party ideology index is excluded from the
Canadian analyses because it did not vary. All cases received a value of one, because there have
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consistently been third parties that espouse postmaterialist values, but a green party has never
won a parliamentary seat. The bivariate correlations indicate that postmaterialist values are
significantly correlated with the percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers and
the percentage of respondents who exhibit strong antiparty sentiment. Also, class voting is
correlated with strong antiparty sentiment.
Again, these correlations introduce the problem of multicollinearity to the multiple
regression analysis. To account for this multiple models are run. The first model includes all
four independent variables. Models 2 through 5 each exclude a different independent variable.
Model 6 excludes both the percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers and the
percentage of respondents who exhibited strong antiparty sentiment. Model 7 excluded both
class voting and postmaterialist values.
Table 3A: Postmaterialist Values and the Occurrence of Hung Parliaments in Canada: Models 1 -3
Dependent Variable: Occurrence of Hung Parliament, in percentage of seats won by
the winningest party (1984-2008)

Model Make-Up
(Variable excluded to
account for collinearity)
Dependent variable

Model l
All variables included

Model 2
Strong antiparty
sentiment excluded

Model 3
Postmaterialist values
excluded

Class Voting

-.704
(.554)

.314
( ..482)

.640
(1.268)

Postrnaterialist Values

-4.599
(1.160)

-2.091**
(.571)

Strong Party Identifiers

.518
(.427)

-.049
(.554)

Strong Antiparty
Sentiment

1 .634
(1.282)

Adjusted R2
F-test
Model Significance

.915
.14.409
(.195)
6

N

***p<.OOl, **p<.05, *p<.10

.149
(1.206)
-2.242
(2.393)

.912
21.847
(.015)
6

.288
1 .674
(.395)
6
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Table 3B: Postmaterialist Values and the Occurrence of Hung Parliaments in Canada: Models 4-7
Dependent Variable: Occurrence of Hung Parliament, in percentage of seats won by
the winningest party (1984-2008)

Model Make-Up
(Variable excluded to
account for
collinearity)
Dependent variable
Class Voting

Postrnaterialist
Values

Model 4
Strong Party
Identifiers excluded

Model 5
Class voting
excluded

-.574
(.605)
-4.292*
(1 .259)

Strong Party
Identifiers

Model 7
Class voting and
postmaterialist
values excluded

.334
(.371)
-4.376**
(1.205)

-2.046***
(.232)

.590
(.584)

.493
(1.173)
-2.755
(1.508)

Strong Antiparty
Sentiment

1.255
(1.381)

2.552
(1.642)

Adjusted R2
F-test
Model Significance

.895
15.153
(.063)
6

.819
10.026
(.045)
6

N

Model 6
Strong party
identifiers and
strong antiparty
sentiment excluded

.934
43.577
(.002)
6

.266
2.086
(.240)
6

***p<.OOl, **p<.05, *p<.10

Model l is not significant, nor is any of its independent variables, which is most likely
due to the various multicollinearity issues present in this model. In all of the subsequent
models, the prevalence of postmaterialist values is the only significant independent variable.
Furthermore, the relationship always is in the hypothesized direction: as the prevalence of
postmaterialist values increases, the percentage of seats won by the winningest party decreases.
Furthermore, only models 2, 4, 5 and 6 are significant, but models 3 and 5 are not. The key
difference between these two sets of models is that the former includes the postmaterialist
values variable and the latter does not. The most instructive comparison is between Model 6
and Model 7 both of which completely resolve any multicollinearity problems. Model 6
accounts for 93.4 % of the variance in the dependent variable and only the postmaterialist values
variable is significant, while Model 7 excludes postmaterialist values and only accounts for
26.6% of the variance. This suggests that the prevalence of postmaterialist values is most
important in explaining the size of the parliamentary majority in Canadian elections.
Analysis of Australia
When analyzing only the Australian cases the third party ideology index is also
excluded because it does not vary. While there has also been a history of third parties
espousing postmaterialist values, the 2010 election is the first federal election in which a green
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party candidate won a seat in the House of Representatives. However, the 2010 Australian
Election Study data is not available at the time of writing and the election has been excluded.
Therefore, all Australian elections scored a value of one for the third party index variable.
Table 4: Postmaterialist Values and the Occurrence of Hung Parliaments in Australia
Dependent Variable: Occurrence of Hung Parliament, in percentage of seats won by winningest party (1987-2007)

Model l
All variables included

Model 2
Strong antiparty sentiment
excluded

Model 3
Postrnaterialist values
excluded

Class Voting

-1.060

-.913**

-1.076***

(Alford Index)

(.321)

(.130)

(.088)

Postmaterialist Values

.362

.424**

.339***

(.154)

(.081)

(.043)

Independent Variables

Percent of Strong Party

1.043

.988**

Identifiers

(1.963)

(.156)

Strong Antiparty

-.172

-5.634*

Sentiment

(10.473)

(1.588)

Adjusted R2

.880

.923

.958

F-test

10.185

21.036

53.870

Model Significance

(.230)

(.046)

(.001)

N

6

6

6

***p<.OO1, **p<.05, *p<.10

The percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers is significantly
correlated with the percentage of respondents who exhibit strong antiparty sentiment, which
indicates multicollinearity. The problem of multicollinearity is addressed by running three
different models. Model l includes all four independent variables. The second model excludes
the percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers. The third model excludes the
percentage of respondents who exhibited strong antiparty sentiment.
Due to multicollinearity, the first model is not significant nor is any of its independent
variables. However, Model 2 is significant and accounts for 92.3 % of the variance in the
dependent variable. All three included independent variables are significant. Model 3 is also
significant and accounts for 95.8% of the variance in the dependent variable. All the variables
included in the model are significant.
In Model 2, the percentage of respondents who exhibit strong antiparty sentiment is
significant in the expected direction: as the percentage of respondents exhibiting antiparty
sentiment increases, the percentage of seats won by the winningest party decreases. In Model 3,
the percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers is significant in the expected
direction: as the percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers decreases, the
percentage of seats won by the winningest party decreases making hung parliaments more
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likely. Class voting is significant in both Model 2 and Model 3, but not in the expected direction:
as class-based voting decreases, the percentage of seats won by the winningest party increases.
In both Model 2 and Model 3, the prevalence of postmaterialist values is significant, but not in
the expected direction. The data show that as the prevalence of postmaterialist values increases,
the percentage of seats won by the winningest party increases. Possible reasons for these
unexpected results will be discussed in the following section.
DISCUSSION
This study set out to find a causal explanation for hung parliaments that is applicable
across all cases. The significance of Model 2 in the overall cross-country analysis, as well as the
significance of postmaterialist values and the percentage of respondents who are strong party
identifiers, all support the theory that the rise of postmaterialist values and corresponding
developments contribute to the increased prevalence of hung parliaments. Three of the five
hypotheses are supported: those regarding the prevalence of postmaterialist values, the
percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers, and the level of antiparty sentiment
(H2, H3, and I-L). The hypotheses regarding class voting and the ideology of third parties are
supported. The simultaneous support of the postmaterialism hypothesis and the lack of
support for class voting suggest that these two developments occur independent of each other
and lends credence to Hout, Brooks, and Manza's argument that class is not declining.
However, the country-by-country analysis shows that no consistent relationship exists across all
three cases. The analyses of each country show a different relationship between the
independent and dependent variables, which suggests that the national context plays an
important role in hung parliament electoral outcomes.
The UK

The analyses of the UK cases show that my theory does not account for the results of the
general elections in this case. Of all three countries, the UK is the only case in which none of the
multiple regression models are significant. This could be due to a variety of factors. Firstly,
class-based voting remains strongest in the UK. Dalton finds that class interests continue to be
important in British politics, but that this influence has declined by approximately fifty percent
between 1950 and 2000.42 However, even with this decline class voting in the UK is still higher
than the other cases in Dalton's study, the US, France and Germany. This is congruent with the
finding in Model 6 of the UK analyses that as class voting decreases - as indicated by lower
scores on the Alford Index - the percentage of parliamentary seats won by the winningest party
decreases. Thus, the decline in class voting that has been noted by Dalton is related to
increasingly narrow electoral margins. However, this study uses a much smaller time period
than Dalton's investigation, which suggests that the observed trends are less pronounced. This
could explain why the class-based voting variable was only significant in one model and why
no models are significant.
42

Dalton 2002.
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Dalton also finds that the UK has lower levels of postmaterialist values than many other
advanced industrial nations.43 It seems that the UK is lagging behind Canada and Australia in
terms of the developments of these values. This case exhibits less pronounced changes than
Canada and Australia, and the significance of the models could then be more highly impacted
by the small number of cases. In order to better understand the UK case, it would be useful to
use a longer period of time. It could be useful to not only go further back in time but also
analyze new data that comes out in the future. This will help to identify whether or not the rise
of postmaterialism and the decline of class are becoming stronger in the UK.
Canada

Of the three countries included, the analysis of the Canada shows the clearest support
for the postmaterialist theory. The increased prevalence of postmaterialist values is related to a
decline in the percentage of seats won by the winningest party in each significant model where
the postmaterialist values variable is included. Furthermore, each model that includes the
postmaterialist values variable explains more than 80% of the variance in the percentage of seats
won by the winningest party. However, the postmaterialist values variable is the only
significant independent variable in any of the models. From the bivariate analyses, we see that
the prevalence of postmaterialist values is positively related to strong antiparty sentiment and
negatively related to the percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers. Since the
data are only bivariate correlations it cannot be discerned whether the change in postmaterialist
values causes a change in antiparty sentiment and strength of party identification or vice versa.
More research is needed to determine the causal direction of these relationships.
According to the theory presented here, one would expect that the increased prevalence of
postmaterialist values amongst the electorate is causing increased antiparty sentiment against
major parties and a decline in the percentage of people who consider themselves strong party
identifiers because major parties have not incorporated postmaterialist values into their
platforms. Also, decreased levels of class-based voting are related to levels of strong antiparty
sentiment. Again, the causal direction of this relationship cannot be proven without further
research, but it is hypothesized that as people become more disgruntled with the traditional
parties, they will be less likely to vote with their natural " class" party.
Finally, class-based voting is not significant in any of the models. This lends further
credence to Hout, Brooks, and Manza's argument that class may not be declining as a
significant electoral cleavage. The fact that class-based voting and postmaterialist values are not
related to each other also further indicates that the processes of increasing postmaterialist
values and declining class are independent of each other.
Australia
The Australian case provided two unexpected results. Both class-based voting and the
prevalence of postmaterialist values are related to the percentage of seats won by the

43 Ibid.
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winningest party, but in the opposite direction than was hypothesized. Firstly, as class-based
voting decreases, the percentage of seats won by the winningest party increases. Secondly, as
the prevalence of postmaterialist values increases, the percentage of seats won by the
winningest party increases.
In order to explain these findings, it was necessary to examine the responses to the
individual questions in the World Values Survey (WVS) from which the postmaterialism index
is derived. Between the two Australian waves of the WVS (1995 and 2005), the biggest shift in
respondents' first priority is a ten percentage point increase in the number of respondents who
named maintaining order in the nation. Furthermore, maintaining order in the nation is cited as
respondents' first choice about twice as often as fighting rising prices in both 1995 and 2005.
These results can be reconciled with Australia's recent economic and security situations.
With regards to its economy, Australia experienced seventeen consecutive years of economic
growth until the global financial crisis. After the financial crisis, Australia's economy
rebounded after only one quarter of negative economic growth, and the government expects to
return to budget surpluses by 2015.44 This history of strong economic conditions in Australia
explains the comparative unimportance of economic issues when measured against maintaining
order in the nation.
In the early 2000s, illegal immigration became Australia's most salient security issue.
The increased importance placed on the issue of illegal immigration is most likely driving the
decline in postmaterialist values from 1995 to 2005 and may account for the observed positive
relationship between postmaterialist values and the percentage of seats won by the winningest
party. Results from the Australian Election Study indicate that the percentage of seats won by
the winningest party may be a function of the degree of consensus in the Australian electorate
on which party is seen as best on issues of national security and defense.45 Thus, the salience of
security issues causes a decrease in the level of postmaterialist values, and the divide in the
electorate over which party is best suited to handle these issues could be correlated with
declining electoral majorities. Furthermore, this shift from viewing the coalition as
overwhelming more capable of dealing with security issues may have led some voters - most
likely working class voters who had voted for the coalition because of their strong position on
national security - to return to their "natural" class-based parties. This accounts for the finding
that as class-voting increases, the percentage of seats won by the winningest party decreases. In
the future, it will be interesting to see how class-based voting and postmaterialism are impacted
if and when the issue of illegal immigration loses political salience.

LIMITATIONS
This study is limited in a several ways. First, only a small number of elections are
included for each case. This is due to the lack of Australian data, as the Australian Election
44

CIA World Factbook 2010.

45 McAllister and Clark 2010, 16.
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Study only bean being conducted in 1987. In order to cover a comparable time span for each
country, the data for earlier elections for Canada and the UK are not included. In closer
analyses of these two cases, it would be beneficial to use a longer time span.
Also, another central weakness is the operationalization of the third party ideology
index. The index was not detailed enough to allow for adequate variation between cases and
had to be excluded from both the Australian and Canadian analyses, which made it impossible
to test the fifth hypothesis in these analyses. Where it has been included in the analysis, the
third party ideology index is never significant. This could be due to the limits of the measure
and not the unimportance of third party ideology itself. A better measure would account for
more dimensions of postmaterialist values than social justice and environmental issues and
allow for a wider range of variance. Data from the election studies could be used in crafting
such a measure, since questions are generally asked about which party is seen as most capable
of dealing with various issues. These sorts of questions could be useful in creating a more
nuanced index. However, a more in depth understanding of third party ideologies and how
that ideology is manifested is required in order to do this. If this concept were accurately
measured, further analysis may in fact show that it does play a role in explaining electoral
outcomes.
FUTURE RESEARCH & CONCLUSIONS
Since this study cannot conclude that its framework provides a universal explanation for
the occurrence of hung parliaments, future research should focus on the individual countries
included in the study, in order to better understand the role of the national context. Future
research should also investigate the impact of illegal immigration on postmaterialist values and
on electoral outcomes in Australia. The Canadian case should be further evaluated in order to
ascertain why postmaterialist values play a much larger role there than in other countries.
Alternative explanations should be investigated for the UK, since this theory does not seem to
explain the cause of its hung parliament. Also, antiparty sentiment should be further
researched since it was the variable that most often exhibited a relationship with the other
independent variables. Research is needed that investigates the causal relationship between
antiparty sentiment and class voting, postmaterialist values, and strong party identification.
This could prove important in better understanding the role of these variables in contributing to
the occurrence of hung parliaments.
This study has endeavored to find a universal explanation for the occurrence of hung
parliaments in advanced industrial democracies. However, the current study has not met this
lofty goal. While the implications of the rise of postmaterialism seem to explain hung
parliaments in Canada, the UK and Australian cases do not provide such clear-cut support for
the present theory. Despite these mixed results, this study has found some causal factors that
influence electoral results in majoritarian parliamentary democracies. This is an important first
step in explaining why hung parliaments occur and to what extent the national context plays a
role in these outcomes.
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